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ABSTRACT

This student booklet and teacher's guide analyze the roots of the conflict resulting in the Yugoslav War in 1991 and examine the impact nationalism is having on European stability. The first section of the student booklet defines nationalism and traces its prominent role in inciting World War I and World War II. The second section describes how Yugoslavia was driven into civil war and surveys the devastation the war has brought to its people. The third section details the West's unsuccessful attempts at brokering a peace agreement and examines the debate over U.S. military intervention in the conflict. The last section highlights other parts of eastern Europe that are falling victim to renewed nationalism and asks what the global community can do in the future to contain this powerful and often destructive force. Chapter titles include: (1) "Nationalism Rising"; (2) "Nationalism: Ghosts from the Past"; (3) "Yugoslavia: 'Self-Determination Gone Mad'"; (4) "The World Edges toward Intervention"; and (5) "The Balkanization of Europe." Seven bibliographic references for further reading conclude the text. The teacher's guide contains lesson plans to be used in conjunction with the student booklet, and includes objectives, a list of key terms, a motivator activity, student activities and handouts, and test materials with an answer key. (EH)

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The Return of Nationalism

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WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

The Return of Nationalism

By Tim Walker

Close Up Foundation
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The Close Up Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that encourages responsible participation in the democratic process through educational programs and publications in government and citizenship. Since its founding in 1970, Close Up has been committed to developing new and better ways for young people, teachers, and a widening circle of citizens of all ages to gain a practical understanding of how public policy affects their lives and how individual and collective efforts affect public policy.

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Nationalism Rising

"Yugoslavia's may well be the war of the future: one waged between different tribes, harboring centuries-old grudges about language, religion, and territory. The tribes may want to dominate each other, to escape each other's clutches, or merely to kill each other. But the main ingredient is the same: visceral hatred of the neighbors."

—*The Economist*,
December 27, 1991

After forty years under the domination of Soviet communism, developing a free-market economic system and secure democratic institutions in eastern Europe was destined to be difficult. The road to freedom and capitalism would take time. Many leaders believed that time, along with encouragement and financial assistance from the West, was all that would be needed. However, as Europe looked to the future, a menace thought to be extinct was about to take it back to the past. That menace was nationalism.

Nationalism was a major player in international events for centuries until the Cold War. After the Cold War's demise in 1990, many thought that forty years of U.S.-Soviet domination had exterminated nationalism for good. However, nationalism's offsprings—tribalism, separatism, and xenophobia—reemerged, threatening the cohesion and stability not only of Europe, but also of the Middle East, Canada, India, and Africa. Nationalism was also a major factor in the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Nationalism is having its most devastating consequences in the former Yugoslavia. The outbreak of a war there between rival national groups has produced terror and destruction on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. The conflict has shocked the world into recognizing that the aggression, fear, and hatred that led to two world wars in the first half of this century are still alive in Europe.

The war in the Yugoslav republics also raises questions about the ability of the major Western powers, including the United States, to exercise world leadership in the post-Cold War era. The unity and determination shown during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 and 1991 were nowhere to be found as Western leaders hesitated and struggled over how to respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Do the Western democracies have the capability or the resolve to confront violent nationalist conflicts? What can the West do to contain nationalism in Europe and the rest of the world?

War in Yugoslavia analyzes the roots of the conflict and examines the impact nationalism is having on European stability. The first section defines nationalism and traces its prominent role in inciting World War I and World War II. The second section describes how Yugoslavia was driven into civil war and surveys the devastation the war has brought to its people. The next section details the West's unsuccessful attempts at brokering a peace agreement and examines the debate over U.S. military intervention in the conflict. The last pages highlight other parts of eastern Europe that are falling victim to renewed nationalism and ask what the global community can do in the future to contain this powerful and often destructive force.

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Nationalism: Ghosts from the Past

For many Americans who grew up during the Cold War, nationalist violence in the former Yugoslavia and other parts of eastern Europe is symbolic of the conflicts of the new international order. However, there is nothing new about nationalism, particularly in Europe; it has been a powerful presence there for centuries. Violent nationalist campaigns were the seeds of World War I and World War II. Given Europe's volatile past, many historians today wonder why the eruption of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 came as a surprise to the leaders of the Western world.

What Is Nationalism?

Many historians define "nationalism" as a nationality's (a group of people with a common racial, geographic, religious, or linguistic background) devotion to or love for their country or nation. When synonymous with patriotism, nationalism can contribute greatly to the unity of a nation. National unity is beneficial to a country's economy and society as a whole.

However, nationalism becomes a threat when patriotism turns into feelings of superiority over other people or countries. Nationalism often results in expansionism, or often successful attempts at conquest of other nations.

Nationalism also includes devotion to a single culture, race, or religion. Many countries are made up of different races, languages, and religions. When these individual groups place their own interests over the interests of the country as a whole, tribalism can emerge. Tribalism is loyalty to one's culture and the tendency to unite with members of that culture only. Tribalism often produces separatist movements that want to break away from other nationalities and form new independent nations. The world witnessed this process in 1990 and 1991 when the Soviet Union splintered into fifteen sovereign states. Another example is the attempt by some in the French-speaking province of Quebec to secede from Canada. Separatist movements say they are merely exercising their right of self-determination, or the right of a nationality to determine its own political and territorial status. The principle of self-determination was promoted by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson after World War I when he said, "National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed by their own consent." However, Wilson and others soon realized that, when carried to extremes, self-determination and forms of nationalism could have disastrous effects on international peace and stability.

One of nationalism's most dangerous extremes is xenophobia—the fear or hatred of foreigners. Racism is a form of xenophobia. Recent violence against nonwhite immigrants in Germany is an example of xenophobia at its worst. Modern history has shown that xenophobia, expansionism, tribalism, and separatism can lead to persecution of minority groups, the disintegration of countries, and war.

"The Powder Keg of Europe" and Nazi Germany

The states that occupy the southern region of eastern Europe are known as the

Balkans (Turkish for "forested mountain"). The Balkans include the modern nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, a section of Turkey, and most of the Yugoslav republics. The region has a diverse population, composed of many different religious, cultural, and linguistic groups. This diversity has triggered nationalist conflict and wars for over 400 years—a history that gave the region the nickname "the powder keg of Europe." The violent history of the Balkans led to the use of the term "balkanization" to describe the breakup of a geographic area or population into smaller and often hostile units.

From the fifteenth to the early twentieth century, the Balkans were part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary. The Turks ruled the southern region, while the Austrians controlled the north. Serbia (later to become part of Yugoslavia) won its independence from the Turks in 1836 and led independence movements in other Balkan states. The Serbs wanted all Slavic populations to be united under one Slavic state. The Austrians' annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 outraged the Serbs and pushed the region toward conflict. Russia sided with the Serbs, who shared their Slavic ancestry, while Germany supported Austria-Hungary. However, armed conflict was avoided at that time.

Rising independence movements in the Balkan states culminated in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, during which an alliance of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria—the Balkan League—expelled the Ottoman Turks from Europe. After the wars, the tension between Serbia and Austria-Hungary grew. With the Ottomans out of the picture, only the Austrians stood in the way of total Balkan independence and Serbia's goal of unifying all Slavic peoples.

In 1914, 19-year-old Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The event led to the escalation of tensions among the European powers and the beginning of World War I.

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Hapsburg heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist. Austria, with the backing of Germany, declared war on Serbia to avenge this crime. To deter a possible Austrian invasion of Serbia, Russia mobilized its armed forces to defend its Slavic neighbor. Germany then declared war on Russia and Russia's ally, France. Great Britain soon jumped in on the side of France and Russia. Within one month of the assassination in Sarajevo, the

entire European continent was engulfed by the war later known as World War I. In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, declaring that the "world must be safe for democracy," brought the United States into the war and helped defeat Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Although the assassination of the Archduke did not create the tensions between the European powers, it was the spark that ignited World War I. World War I was called the "war to end all wars," but nationalism triggered an even bloodier global conflict twenty years later.

"The Final Solution." The destructive force of nationalism was witnessed most vividly in Germany during Adolf Hitler's brutal Nazi regime. Hitler's goal of creating a "New Order" in Europe led to the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

Hitler and his National Socialist (Nazi) Party rose to power in 1932 by exploiting Germany's lingering bitterness over its defeat in World War I and the mass unemployment brought on by the economic depression of the 1920s. Hitler rallied his followers by blaming his country's problems on Germany's Jewish population, whom he called traitors. He spoke passionately about the need for Germany to "purify" itself of all "undesirables" and unite as an Aryan race. (Hitler used the word Aryan to describe non-Jewish Caucasians.) Hitler vowed to regain territories lost in World War I and conquer even more territory so that Europe would eventually be ruled by what he called the master Aryan people.

The German public, swept up by Hitler's powerful nationalist oratory, was sold on Nazism, and anti-Semitism—the hatred of Jewish people—spread through-



The rise of Nazism in Germany during the 1930s epitomizes to many the dangerous consequences of nationalism.

out the country. In an attempt to achieve Aryan supremacy, Germany conquered much of eastern Europe, including Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Hitler deeply hated the Slavic populations of these nations and considered them people who should be used as slaves. As Germany crushed eastern Europe, Hitler and the Nazis carried out his "Final Solution"—the systematic extermination of Jewish and other "racially inferior" populations, a program that was later known as the Holocaust.

Germany was eventually defeated by the Allied powers, and Hitler committed suicide in April 1945. However, the destruction of much of Europe during World War II, including the murder of 6 million Jews, has since served as a somber reminder of the terror a powerful nationalist message can unleash.

Was the Cold War the "Long Peace"?

In 1946, with Europe and Asia in ruins from the war, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two global superpowers. Over the next forty years, the tense competition between the two nations—the Cold War—dominated world affairs. The Soviets controlled eastern Europe, establishing communist "puppet" governments, while the United States acted to deter Soviet aggression in western Europe. The two superpowers also extended their respective "spheres of influence" in other parts of the world.

The Cold War was a period from 1946 to 1990 of high international tension. However, the Cold War helped to prevent the eruption of the kind of conflicts that had produced so much bloodshed in the past. The division of global influence between two powerful nations—the bipolar system—created political stability throughout Europe and other parts of the world. The Soviet Union's control of eastern Europe kept a tight lid on ethnic and nationalist tensions there. The ominous presence of Soviet and U.S./European nuclear weapons on the continent created a stability not seen in Europe for centuries. Historian John Lewis Gaddis says the Cold War was, in fact, "the Long Peace."

Back to the Future. When the Cold War ended in 1990 and the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, many world leaders expected that newly democratic eastern European countries would transform to capitalism. However, free from Soviet domination, eastern European nationalities began to assert their independence and sovereignty, just as they did prior to World War I. A new wave of nationalism had been building in western Europe as well. Increased immigration to Great Britain, France, and Germany during the 1970s and 1980s intensified xenophobia among white Europeans.

In 1990 and 1991, the United States focused on crises in the Middle East and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, not on eastern Europe. After the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War, President George Bush declared that the United States would take the lead in establishing a "new world order" in which all aggression would be stopped by a U.S.-led alliance of democratic nations. However, few U.S. policymakers expected this alliance to be tested in a Balkan country that most Americans

could not locate on a map. French political analyst Pierre Hassner wrote: "Like pre-1914 Europe, the new world order of George Bush died in Sarajevo."

Yugoslavia: "Self-determination Gone Mad"

In the early 1970s, journalist Dusko Doder, after traveling through Yugoslavia, wrote: "After a few weeks, I realized that there was no such thing as Yugoslavia. There are Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and others who in some respects seem as unlike each other as people from different countries." Twenty years later, many who long recognized the artificiality of the Yugoslav federation probably were not surprised at its violent disintegration in 1991. Others mistakenly believed that forty-five years of authoritarian communist rule had suffocated nationalism in Yugoslavia and other eastern European nations.

Political and economic developments in Yugoslavia during the late 1980s advanced the ethnic and religious polarization that set the country on a course toward breakup and civil war in 1991. The world soon was horrified at the escalation of violence and reports of Nazi-style atrocities. Yugoslavia, one U.S. State Department official said, was "the prime example of self-determination gone mad." Although the Western countries wanted to stop the killing, debate over national interests and fears of "another Vietnam" left the United States and Europe frustrated and paralyzed.

The allies' failure to commit themselves to a strong plan of action for ending the war in the former Yugoslavia prompted many experts to ask whether the West had the ability to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

An Uneasy Federation

Located along the Balkan peninsula, the area that became Yugoslavia was created in 1918 by the international community as part of the peace agreement that ended World War I. Then called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the country united elements of the former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. It was renamed Yugoslavia (literally "land of the south Slavs") in 1929 and was made up of five major Slavic nationalities—Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Serbian—as well as other religious and ethnic groups. The "Yugoslav idea," as it was called, was to create Slavic harmony.

However, from its outset, Yugoslavia's diverse religious patchwork was a source of division and conflict. Serbs and Macedonians are Eastern Orthodox; Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic. Tensions between Serbs and Croats, the two dominant groups, were particularly high and often provoked violence. In addition to their religious differences, the two nationalities competed for power. The Serbs—the largest ethnic group at 36 percent of the population—believed they were entitled to dominate Yugoslavia because they played such a pivotal role in its creation. Not about to submit themselves to Serbian rule, the Croatians wanted Yugoslavia to be a looser political structure that gave more autonomy to the republics and ethnic groups.

Capitalizing on tensions within the country, Nazi Germany carved Yugoslavia into rival warring factions in 1941. Croatia allied itself with the Nazis and established the Independent State of Croatia. Resistance groups to fight the Nazis formed in the Yugoslav republics, including the communist Partisans, led by Marshall Broz Tito, a Croat. Yugoslavia plunged into a bloody civil war to simultaneously reunite the country and liberate itself from Nazi rule. During this conflict, Serbs and Croats slaughtered one another by the hundreds of thousands.

The depth of hatred among Yugoslavia's national groups that emerged after World War II led the world to believe that the Yugoslav idea was finished. However, the charismatic Tito seized power and managed to reunify the country. In 1946, he established the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Tito's Legacy. Marshall Tito understood the volatility of Yugoslavia's multinational population. A key element of his rule was to delicately balance the interests of Yugoslavia's national groups. To achieve this parity, Tito weakened the Serbs by dividing up their land. A section of southern Serbia was incorporated into the republic of Macedonia; the former Serb kingdom of Montenegro was

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now a republic in its own right; and two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were made into autonomous regions.

Although Yugoslavia was a communist state, Tito decentralized its government to give the republics more control over their affairs. The federal government in the capital of Belgrade (located in Serbia) was responsible for foreign affairs and the maintenance of a broad socialist economy, but the republics were given a degree of economic autonomy. While northern republics—notably Croatia and Slovenia—prospered, southern republics fell behind. The richer republics demanded more autonomy, but the poorer ones called on the federal government to transfer wealth from the north to them.

As economic interests among the republics came into conflict, it became more difficult for Tito to preserve Yugoslav unity. When he died in May 1980, the alteration of Yugoslavia's political system and boundaries became inevitable.

The Politics of Nationalism. During the 1980s, the power of the Yugoslav federal government in Belgrade diminished as the six republics acquired more autonomy. Tito's office of President of the Federation was abolished and replaced by an eight-member collective presidency with limited powers. Representatives from each of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces rotated as President of the State Presidency on an annual basis.

In 1990, as communism's power faded, multiparty elections were held in the six Yugoslav republics, bringing nationalist-oriented leaders to power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Communists retained power in Serbia and Montenegro. New Slovene President Milan Kukan and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman wanted to pursue capitalism and democratization and demanded sovereignty for their republics. Both threatened to secede unless Yugoslavia became a "confederation of sovereign states." However, Slobodan Milosevic, president of the republic of Serbia, was committed to preventing Yugoslavia from breaking up. The Serbian president's vision of the new Yugoslavia was radically different from that of his Croatian and Slovene counterparts.

"Greater Serbia." Most experts agree that Milosevic, a dedicated communist, was the political figure in Yugoslavia most responsible for fanning the flames of violent nationalism in 1990. The leaders of Croatia and Slovenia promoted separatism only to secure economic and political independence for their republics. On the other hand, Milosevic used nationalist rhetoric to stir up Serbians' age-old hatred of their neighbors. The Serbian leader vowed to restore the Serb domination of Yugoslavia that Tito had attempted to destroy. Milosevic vowed to reunite all Serbs scattered throughout Yugoslavia, even if it required conquering neighboring Yugoslav territories.

Milosevic opposed the independence of Slovenia and especially Croatia because of what he called the "Serbian question"—the future of the 25 percent of Yugoslavia's Serbs who live outside of Serbia (mostly in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Serbs in Croatia (12 percent of the population) vehemently opposed its independence because of fears they would be at the mercy of the

Tudjman government. With memories still alive of persecution by Croats during World War II, the Serbs believed they would be harassed and discriminated against if Croatia seceded. Although President Tudjman said minority rights would be respected in an independent Croatia, his government passed constitutional provisions no longer recognizing Serbs as a major ethnic group.

Milosevic told the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia that if they insisted on independence, then their boundaries would have to be redrawn to "link" all Serb populations to Serbia so that they could live under the banner of "Greater Serbia." Milosevic had the military clout to make his dream of a "Greater Serbia" a reality. No longer taking orders from the central government in Belgrade, the Serb-dominated officer corps of the Yugoslav army (the fourth largest army in Europe) was now firmly aligned with Milosevic.

Secession and Bloodshed

On June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia announced their intention to secede from the Yugoslav federation. The next day, the Yugoslav national army, on orders from Milosevic, launched attacks on the two republics, and the war in Yugoslavia had begun. The Yugoslav army was turned back by Slovenian forces in ten days. On July 18, 1991, Slovenia and Serbia reached an agreement whereby the Yugoslav army withdrew from Slovenia, clearing the way for the republic's full independence.

Milosevic never considered Slovenia, with its small Serb population, an essential component of "Greater Serbia." While Slovenia was free to go, Croatia was not, and the army escalated its assault there into a full-scale war. Serb shelling devastated Croat towns and villages and killed thousands of civilians. By the end of 1991, Serbs controlled over one-third of Croatia, and the Croatian government pleaded for international intervention.

International Outrage but Little Action. When hostilities broke out in mid-1991, the international community was slow to respond. The European Community (EC) and the United States initially supported Yugoslav unity and refused to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The leaders of western Europe were too preoccupied with building an economically unified Europe to be distracted by a messy civil war in eastern Europe. With its diplomatic and military efforts focused on the Middle East and the Soviet Union, the Bush administration paid little attention to Yugoslavia, a country whose political structure was of no apparent U.S. national interest. "We don't have a dog in that fight," Secretary of State James Baker said. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refused to send a peacekeeping force to Croatia because it was an "out of area conflict." (Yugoslavia was not a member of NATO.) Even the United Nations preferred to stay on the sidelines. Officials cited the UN's traditional reluctance to get involved in the domestic disputes of sovereign nations until a regional attempt is made to solve the problem.

During the early stages of the war, Western nations believed all sides were

Yugoslav national army soldiers (pictured above) move into defensive positions during a battle with Slovenian forces in July 1991.

to blame. Serbia may have been the main aggressor, but the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia had aggravated tensions by breaking away from the federation. Some countries saw Milosevic simply as trying to hold Yugoslavia together. Accordingly, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on all Yugoslav republics in late 1991.

Because the war in Croatia was in its own backyard, the European Community felt compelled to take a reluctant lead in peace negotiations, but was divided over recognition of Croatia. Germany supported recognition, citing the right to self-determination and Serbia's blatant aggression. Great Britain and France, on the other hand, believed recognition was an endorsement of separatism and would encourage other European nationalities to demand independence.

While the international community called for Yugoslav unity, the federal government in Belgrade knew that Yugoslavia was finished. In December 1991, Yugoslav President Stipe Mesic resigned, explaining that "Yugoslavia no longer exists." (In April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Much of the international community, including the United States, has not recognized that state.)

As the war in Croatia entered its fifth month, the United Nations took over the EC's mediation efforts and brokered a peace agreement to end the war between Croatia and Serbia. The Serbs came away controlling one-third of Croatia's territory. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman vowed that Croats would one day take that land back.

Despite losing Slovenia and winning only half a victory in Croatia, Milosevic refused to quit. His "Greater Serbia" could still become a reality with a successful military campaign in Bosnia—the Yugoslav republic with the largest Serb population outside of Serbia.

The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina

In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina (population 4,355,000) was the most ethnically diverse Yugoslav republic—44 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serb, 18 percent Croatian, and roughly 6 percent Yugoslav (those who did not identify with any particular ethnic group). Located between Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia was often called the buffer zone between the two rivals.

Many Bosnians converted to Islam after the Turkish Ottoman Empire conquered Bosnia in 1463, and remained Muslim even after the Turks were expelled from Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Serbia and Croatia never were comfortable with so many of their fellow Serbs and Croats living in a predominantly Muslim republic and had always targeted Bosnia for partition. Although long-standing hatred between Bosnia's Croats and Serbs and suspicion toward the Muslims simmered below the surface, the three groups were able to coexist peacefully.

However, democratization in 1990 splintered the Bosnian population. Newly created political parties in Bosnia defined themselves along ethnic lines—the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (MPDA), the Croatian Democratic Community (CDC), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP). By virtue of the Muslims' majority status, the MPDA captured the presidency and control of the parliament in Bosnia's democratic elections.

With war raging on its borders and Yugoslavia collapsing around it, Bosnia had to determine its own future. In theory, the republic could remain part of a scaled-back Yugoslavia and be dominated by Serbia, or possibly be partitioned by Serbia and Croatia in a widening war. Bosnian Muslims chose independence, the third and what seemed to be only viable option. Bosnian Croats did not want the republic to be independent but did favor secession in order to be united with Croatia. Despite their conflicting goals,

UN Photo 182308/M. Grant

Along with Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic (pictured above) is considered to be a mastermind behind Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both men have been named by the U.S. State Department and the United Nations as probable war criminals.

Bosnia's Croats and Muslims shared a common distrust of Serbia and formed a fragile alliance. In October 1991, they passed a resolution in the National Assembly declaring Bosnia's intention to secede from Yugoslavia.

Bosnian Serbs were concerned that the Muslims were planning on turning the republic into an Islamic state. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said such fears were unwarranted. Encouraged by Serbian President Milosevic, the Bosnian Serbs, led by SDP chief Radovan Karadzic, passed their own resolution declaring that Serbian-dominated regions in the republic would become part of Serbia if Bosnia seceded. Milosevic assured Karadzic that his army would bring Bosnia's Serbs into "Greater Serbia."

In a February 1992 national referendum boycotted by the Serbs, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat populations voted overwhelmingly for independence. Hoping to ward off another Serb attack, the United States and the European Community recognized the independence of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia on April 7. However, Milosevic and Karadzic were determined to unite Bosnia's Serb population with Serbia.

On April 8, Bosnian Serb militia units, backed by the Yugoslav national army, staged air and ground assaults on Muslim-dominated towns in eastern Bosnia. With a vastly superior military force, Serbs also quickly captured Croat-populated regions. Serb forces battered and terrorized towns with artillery fire and sniper attacks and cut off food supplies and communications.

Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, was the Serbs' most important target. Capturing the city was essential if they were to "link" Serbian regions in the north with Serbian regions in the south. To achieve this, the Serbs would have to destroy all that lay between.

"Ethnic Cleansing." In most wars, death and displacement of civilians is a tragic, mostly unintended consequence. In the war in Bosnia, it has been to a great extent the strategy. "Greater Serbia" could not be established with huge Muslim and Croat populations standing in its way. The Serbs' campaign of random murder, torture, and expulsion became known as "ethnic cleansing."

In the summer of 1992, reports emerged out of Bosnia telling of Serb-run detention camps imprisoning an estimated 130,000 Muslims and Croats. Only rumors at first, the existence of these camps was confirmed by television news footage of skeletal figures looking out from behind fences of barbed wire. These images brought back haunting memories of Nazi concentration camps during World War II. The world heard descriptions and saw photographs of atrocities thought to have been left behind in 1945.

A Muslim survivor from a northern Bosnian town recalled how Serbs held thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians in metal cages for days without food or water. Every other day, soldiers would take twenty prisoners out and either shoot or beat them to death. In the Bosnian town of Tuzla, eyewitnesses claimed they saw a group of Muslim women chained to a fence and raped by Serb soldiers. Some were set free because they were "ready to have Serbian babies." Older women were doused with gasoline

and set on fire. A report verified by the EC said that in 1992, 20,000 Muslim women were raped by Serbian soldiers in attacks in their homes or in special "rape camps." Rape, the report said, had been used as "a weapon of war."

Despite hundreds of eyewitness accounts, the Bosnian Serb leadership denied reports of murder, rape, and detention camps. Radovan Karadzic said, "It is all initiated by Muslim propaganda. It is so obvious. It is a matter of public relations, and soon the truth will bloom." Although virtually no one accepted their denials, the Serbs were not the only guilty party. Croats had also reportedly set up their own detention camps for Serbian prisoners and killed innocent civilians.

A Humanitarian Nightmare. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia has created the worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Muslims are now classified as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Since 1991, UNHCR officials have been stationed in the former Yugoslavia in an often futile attempt to deliver relief supplies to refugees or cities under siege. Despite being guarded by UN protection forces (primarily made up of European troops), relief convoys are harassed, detained, hijacked, or even shot at. The UNHCR estimated that during 1992, no more than one-third of the necessary aid got through. Consequently, thousands of people in Bosnia died from starvation and illness during the 1992-93 winter.

The most dramatic UNHCR operation took place in April 1993 in Srebrenica, an eastern Bosnian Muslim enclave then under heavy Serb attack.

United Nations workers and soldiers offload food and medicine for Bosnian refugees from an airlift plane at Sarajevo's airport in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Srebrenica was another territory that the Serbs had to capture and "clean out" to link northern and southern Serb regions. As Serb forces converged on Srebrenica, UN convoys undertook an emergency evacuation of the town's 60,000 inhabitants. Packed tightly into trucks, thousands of refugees were taken to the Muslim town of Tuzla, but only after Serb military commanders promised to let the convoys go safely.

The evacuation from Srebrenica posed a dilemma for the United Nations. Some critics suggested that the evacuation amounted to giving Srebrenica to the Serbs and therefore assisting them in creating "Greater Serbia." However, UN humanitarian officials felt they had no other way to save lives, even if it meant aiding Serb military objectives.

The World Edges Toward Intervention

Many observers believe that the appalling images seen on television of the agony at Srebrenica toughened Western resolve to take strong action to stop aggression and end the war. The Serbs' relentless shelling of Sarajevo and other Bosnian towns and villages continued as cease-fire agreements collapsed one after the other. As one U.S. State Department official said, "Suddenly, the war became too awful to ignore." In the spring of 1993, as the conflict in Bosnia approached its one-year anniversary, the United States and western Europe began to consider more decisive measures to bring the war to an end.

In 1992 the international community had remained reluctant and unsure about how to respond to the escalating crisis. Western leaders hoped that the conflict would burn itself out and the warring factions would eventually negotiate a settlement. Many experts believe this approach was naive and only underscored the West's failure to understand the nature of the conflict. The United States and its allies underestimated the depth of the hatred among Yugoslavia's national groups. As the death toll neared 100,000 and "Greater Serbia" came within the Serbs' reach (70 percent of Bosnia was under their control), Bosnia's pleas for the West to do something—anything—to stop the Serbs grew louder. European and U.S. leaders agreed that stopping Serbia was the key to stopping the war. But how could this be done? And who would take the lead?

Military intervention beyond protecting UN humanitarian convoys in Bosnia was out of the question to most Western leaders. The Balkans' perceived strategic insignificance and its long his-

Stasia R. Winter

UNHCR/22031/A. Hollmann

The enormous human suffering brought on by the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina provoked calls for international intervention. At left, a Muslim prisoner lies near death in a Serbian-run detention camp in northern Bosnia. At right, a Croatian woman comes home to find her house destroyed by artillery fire.

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tory as a war zone made any kind of military action politically unacceptable. The West opted for a combination of moderate economic pressure and "muscular diplomacy" to force the Serbs into a peace agreement. As those initiatives failed in early 1993, the United States attempted to rally support among its allies for tougher economic sanctions and military force against the Serbs.

Pressuring the Serbs into Peace

Soon after war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, the European Community (EC) approved a small package of economic sanctions against Serbia. One week later, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that condemned Serbia's aggression and imposed a strong economic embargo against its government. Many experts believed at the time that sanctions would have little effect since the Bosnian Serbs were virtually self-sufficient in food and had stockpiled huge supplies of weapons and other goods, including fuel.

In August 1992, the EC succeeded in bringing the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to the peace table. However, hammering out an agreement acceptable to all sides would be difficult; each side had its own conditions for peace. The Serbs believed they were entitled to two-thirds of Bosnian territory, most of which they had seized during the war, and refused to retreat from their goal of linking Serb territories. The Croats would accept the Serbs' territorial gains if they were given the remaining one-third of Bosnia, thereby leaving the Muslims with only a small segment of land or perhaps nothing. This arrangement, according to most experts, would essentially amount to a partition of Bosnia. European officials feared that if the Serbs got their way, a dispossessed and vengeful Muslim population (in a situation similar to that of the Palestinians in the Middle East) would exist on the edge of western Europe. Bosnian Muslims wanted the republic to remain a unified state under a centralized Muslim-dominated government and demanded that the Serbs give back all territories seized by force. Finding common ground between the Serbs—the war's main aggressors—and the Muslims—its greatest victims—would prove to be an enormous task.

The Vance/Owen Peace Plan. A breakthrough in negotiations occurred in December 1992 with the unveiling of a peace plan authored by UN envoy Cyrus Vance and his EC counterpart, Lord David Owen. The proposal called for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten semiautonomous provinces, with three each going to the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (the tenth, Sarajevo, would be a neutral territory divided equally between the three groups). However, Bosnian land area would not be distributed evenly. Serbs would control roughly 40 percent; Croats and Muslims would each receive 30 percent. Under the plan, a weak Bosnian central government would continue to exist.

In March 1993, peace seemed possible. A cease-fire in Bosnia was holding and the Croats—whose share of Bosnian territory would actually increase under the Vance/Owen plan—quickly accepted the proposal. Soon, the Bosnian president agreed to the plan after winning commitments from the United Nations

that Sarajevo would remain with a Muslim majority and that a UN peacekeeping force would patrol all areas. However, the Serbs remained defiant. They objected to the Vance/Owen plan because it forced them to give up too much of the territory they had seized and the Serb provinces on the map were not linked together. Karadzic declared that "there was no chance my people will accept the map. I will tell them about the worst possibilities of sanctions and pressures. Then you will find 12 million Serbs are ready to be opposed to the whole world."

Looking to the United States for Leadership

Most experts believe that when Milosevic and Karadzic masterminded Serbian aggression in Bosnia in early 1992, they knew that the European Community did not have the political will or military power to intervene with force. By the end of the year, their gamble was paying off. Serb assaults on Muslim towns and villages continued without any fear of attack from the outside. As the war dragged on, concerns arose among Europe's leaders that it could spill over into neighboring eastern European countries. Said one British official, it was time for "big brother to come to the rescue."

However, in 1992, the United States was not prepared to "come to the rescue." The consensus among the American public and in Congress was to stay out of the conflict. U.S. policymakers believed that the civil war in Yugoslavia was a European problem that required a European solution. President George Bush supported economic sanctions, encouraged the peace process, and won UN approval of a "no-fly" zone forbidding Serb aircraft from entering Bosnian air space. However, any type of U.S. military intervention was ruled out.

Many military officials and members of Congress argue that the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless: (1) a clear strategic goal exists; (2) there is a good chance for quick success and low casualties; (3) a clear national security interest is at stake; and (4) there is a consensus among Americans for action. These critics believe that the war in Bosnia does not meet any of these criteria. Opponents of U.S. military intervention believe that events in the former Yugoslavia (or in any other eastern European country) do not pose enough of a threat to U.S. national interests to risk the loss of American lives. U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, critics argue, could become "another Vietnam" or a military quagmire; once U.S. forces were committed, it would be difficult to get them out. Like the Vietnam War, the conflict in Bosnia is essentially a civil war being fought on mountainous and heavily forested terrain.

Advocates for using force argue that it is reprehensible that the United States, the world's only superpower, refuses to use its military might to stop the worst carnage in Europe since World War II. According to some supporters of military intervention, the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia provides a compelling enough reason to take action. In addition, many contend that the war in the former Yugoslavia does pose a threat to U.S. national security or interests. If the eth-

nic conflict spills over into neighboring countries, much of the European continent could be pulled into the war. Many foreign affairs analysts believe that nationalist leaders, after witnessing the West's inaction in the former Yugoslavia, will be encouraged to wage other expansionist wars.

When Bill Clinton became president in January 1993, many observers expected the new administration to take a tougher stand against Serbia. During the presidential campaign, Clinton said the United States must "do whatever it takes to stop the slaughter of civilians," and suggested that as president he would seriously consider ordering air strikes on Serb artillery units. However, after meetings with military advisers, the new president realized that military intervention was an enormous gamble. In a clear departure from the Bush administration's policy, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that the war in Bosnia was a serious threat to European stability, and therefore a vital U.S. national interest. The Clinton administration announced that American aircraft would begin airdropping food and medicine over besieged Muslim villages that had been cut off from UN aid convoys. In addition, after the Croats and Muslims accepted the Vance/Owen plan, President Clinton promised a diplomatic "full-court press" to bring the Serbs on board.

Tightening the Screws. After the Serbs, on April 17, rejected the Vance/Owen plan for the second time, the Clinton administration called on the UN Security Council to impose new economic sanctions to close the coast of Serbia from all cargo vessels. Earlier sanctions were already devastating Serbia's economy. Seventy-five percent of the goods flowing in and out of Serbia had been cut off, half of its work force was unemployed, and inflation was rising at an average of 300 percent every month. U.S. officials believed that as Serbia's economy neared total collapse, Milosevic would pressure Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance/Owen plan.

Before new sanctions could be imposed by the United Nations, the United States needed Russia's support. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was prepared to vote for the new measures, but hardliners in the parliament wanted Russia to protect the Serbs, with whom it shares a common Slavic heritage, and veto the



UN Photo 182495

In 1992 and 1993, United Nations envoy and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (left) and European Community representative Lord David Owen of Great Britain led the international effort to broker a peace agreement between warring factions in Bosnia. Their plan to divide the republic into ten provinces was approved by the Croats and Muslims, but rejected by the Serbs. Vance resigned from his UN post in May 1993.

sanctions. After a national referendum on April 26 gave the Russian president an overwhelming vote of confidence, Yeltsin supported the new sanctions on Serbia. The UN approved the measure and gave the Bosnian Serbs until the end of April to accept the Vance/Owen plan before new sanctions were imposed.

To increase the pressure, the United States also issued the first threat of military force. The Clinton administration proposed to its European allies a strategy called "lift and strike." Under this plan, the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia would be lifted to enable the Bosnian Muslims to acquire heavy armaments. Throughout the war, the Muslims have been overwhelmed by the massive firepower of the Serbs. Because of the arms embargo, they could not import weapons to defend themselves, while the Serbs were heavily armed and assisted by the national army. U.S. officials believed that lifting the arms embargo would create a "level playing field." Allied aircraft would bomb Serb artillery positions until the Muslims had the weapons necessary to adequately defend themselves. The Clinton administration emphasized that no U.S. ground forces would be involved, and that the United States would not act unilaterally, but only in accordance with its European allies.

Milosevic Retreats. With his country's economy in ruins, Russia no longer an ally, and the threat of U.S. air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic buckled under the pressure as new UN sanctions went into effect on April 27. Milosevic urged Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb assembly to approve the Vance/Owen plan. In a stunning turnaround, the architect of "Greater Serbia" and the leader who gave the Bosnian Serbs the weapons to carry out "ethnic cleansing" was playing peacemaker. In early May, UN mediators and Milosevic persuaded Karadzic to sign the Vance/Owen plan.

Another Nuremberg?

The reports of atrocities committed predominantly by Serbian forces against Bosnian civilians have brought back haunting memories of Nazi war crimes during World War II. History may also repeat itself in how the world plans to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. In March 1993, the United Nations Security Council voted to establish an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed during the war in the former Yugoslavia—the first internationally mandated forum to deal with such crimes since the Nuremberg trials following World War II.

In 1945 and 1946, twenty-two top Nazi officials were tried as war criminals in Nuremberg, Germany. They were indicted on four specific counts, the most prominent being "crimes against humanity"—exterminations, deportations, and genocide. Twelve were sentenced to death, three were given life sentences, four were sentenced for up to twenty years, and three were acquitted.

It is the Nuremberg model that the UN hopes to follow when and if the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ends. The new war crimes tribunal was established in response to reports of mass killings, systematic rape, torture of prisoners, and random destruction of civilian homes—all components of the Serbian campaign of "ethnic cleansing" and all "crimes against humanity." After the Security Council passed the war crimes tribunal resolution, U.S. Ambas-

Defendants in their dock at the Nuremberg trials in 1946.

sador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright said: "There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have been reaffirmed. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may finally have taken hold in our collective memory."

Although all sides in the Yugoslav conflict have committed war crimes, the Serbs are the main target of the new tribunal. The U.S. State Department has named Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic, and four other Serb officials as war criminals. Two Croats and one Muslim have also been singled out. However, many observers question the West's commitment to prosecuting these crimes. Some skeptics believe the United States raised the issue of Serb war crimes to compensate for its reluctance to use military force in the conflict in late 1992. Furthermore, unless there is a full-scale invasion of Bosnia and Serbia, the arrests of Milosevic, Karadzic, and the other suspects are unlikely. In addition, unlike that of the Nazis, the Serb military chain of command is unclear, and no paper trail exists detailing military activities, which would make pinpointing many offenders difficult.

"No one knows where this will lead," said a Western diplomat in Belgrade, "but we have crimes here of such a scale that you can't just wash your hands of them."

However, Karadzic warned that the Bosnian Serb assembly would also have to approve the plan before it could be implemented.

The assembly convened to reconsider the proposal and immediately demanded a list of concessions, including the immediate lifting of all economic sanctions. EC envoy Owen did change the plan's map to include a small UN-monitored "corridor" that linked Serb regions. Despite this major concession, the Bosnian Serb assembly voted 51 to 2 to reject the Vance/Owen plan. In a

speech to the assembly, Milosevic attacked the Bosnian Serbs as irresponsible and compared them to "drunken sailors putting everything on one card." However, the Bosnian Serbs reinforced their assembly's decision by overwhelmingly rejecting the Vance/Owen plan in a public referendum. Milosevic immediately announced that Serbia would cut off all supplies, including weapons, to the Bosnian Serbs. However, the West was skeptical that Milosevic would abandon his fellow Serbs.

Stepping Back from the Brink. As united as the Bosnian Serbs were over their rejection of the Vance/Owen plan, so were the United States and its European allies divided over military action. In early May, France, Germany, and Great Britain rejected the Clinton administration's "lift and strike" proposal.

European leaders believed that lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims would create not a "level playing field," but, in the words of British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, a "level killing field." Opponents of lifting the arms embargo argue that putting weapons in the hands of vengeful Muslims would only intensify the killing and widen the war. Advocates of lifting the embargo believe that if the Muslims were capable of defending themselves, the Serbs would be more compelled to sign a peace agreement. However, Serb threats to attack British and French humanitarian troops stationed in Bosnia if the embargo was lifted or if the Western allies ordered air strikes hardened Europe's opposition to President Clinton's proposal. With discord between the United States and Europe widening, the Clinton administration announced on May 10 that military action against the Serbs had effectively been "put on hold."

A Shift to Containment

Many observers believed that the Bosnian Serbs, by rejecting the Vance/Owen plan, had called the West's bluff and had won. After the United States and Europe dropped plans for military action, the Serbs resumed their attacks on Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. The war on the ground in Bosnia also took on a new dimension. The Croats and Muslims—once former allies—took up arms against each other. Anticipating the implementation of a peace plan, Croat forces began forcibly expelling Muslims from central and southwestern Bosnian provinces that the Vance/Owen map had allotted to the Croats.

Many observers believed that the fighting between the Croats and Muslims complicated the objectives of possible military action. Suddenly, it appeared as if the West would have to stop the Croats as well as the Serbs—a prospect that made the West even more reluctant to place its armed forces in the middle of a widening civil war. However, although they were not prepared to use force to roll back Serb or Croat aggression, the United States and Europe announced that they would take steps to keep it from spreading and prevent further massacre. In May 1993, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and Spain agreed on a plan to implement "safe havens" in Bosnia to protect Muslim towns and refugees from attack with UN peacekeepers. Secretary of State Warren

Christopher announced that although U.S. ground troops would not be part of the force, the United States would use air power to protect the peacekeepers.

The allied plan was denounced by many leaders, including Bosnian President Izetbegovic. He accused the West of abandoning the Muslims and caving in to the Serbs. Izetbegovic argued that safe havens would "ghettoize" Bosnia's Muslim population and allow the Serbs to hold on to every inch of territory that they had seized with ethnic cleansing. Others contended that the plan was the only realistic option available. If the United States and Europe could not agree on military action to reverse Serb advances, then the protection of Bosnian Muslims and the containment of the conflict while peace negotiations resumed was better than nothing.

However, perhaps the the most formidable challenge facing the United States and its allies will be keeping peace if an agreement is eventually signed.

The Perils of Peacekeeping. Most experts say that a document with three signatures on it will not by itself contain centuries-old hatred in Bosnia, but that a massive peacekeeping operation might. Most observers agree that if the United States and its allies are not committed to supplying the necessary number of troops to enforce a peace plan, they are wasting their time trying to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to sign it. According to many military and foreign policy experts, without the quick deployment of a large peacekeeping force to Bosnia, any peace agreement will be dead on arrival.

NATO, unlike the United Nations or any other multinational organization, does have the military muscle and the "command and control" capabilities to carry out the mission in Bosnia. NATO officials believe roughly 75,000 troops would be needed to patrol the republic, but that the number could increase to as much as 150,000. Of the 75,000 troops, about 25,000 would come from the United States. Assembling such a large force would be difficult. With the huge cost involved in such a deployment, the budget constraints facing each country, and the political risks involved, many experts doubt that the number of troops required for an adequate force would be met.

Even if NATO deploys a sizeable force in Bosnia, keeping the peace there will likely be dangerous. Some say the mission could resemble the disastrous

The White House

The war in the former Yugoslavia was the first international crisis that President Bill Clinton faced (center, with Vice President Al Gore, left, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, right). In April 1993, Clinton attempted unsuccessfully to win European support for air strikes against the Serbs and lifting the arms embargo against the Muslims.

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U.S. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon where 265 American soldiers were killed by a terrorist bomb in 1983. Many military experts argue that NATO peacekeeping forces would become "sitting ducks" to Serb and Croat sniper fire. Critics also say that imposing a peace settlement on warring factions in Bosnia would require a long-term commitment. According to one NATO official, "It could be a never-ending story, keeping those sides apart."

Most experts concede that a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia would likely drag on for years and might result in American and European casualties. However, the alternative—leaving the region unguarded—may be even more costly in the long term. Many experts believe that the first two years of war in the former Yugoslavia have undermined the rules of international law, the authority of the United Nations, and the reputation of the United States as the leader of the "new world order." A serious peacekeeping effort in Bosnia can perhaps help reestablish these principles.

Just as important, a peacekeeping mission can also prevent the eruption of other nationalist wars. The movements and beliefs that could make such conflicts possible—tribalism, separatism, and xenophobia—are already reemerging in other parts of eastern Europe.

The Republics of the Former Yugoslavia

Republic	Population (in millions)	Area (sq. miles)	Major Ethnic Groups
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.37	51,130	Muslims, 44% Serbs, 32% Croats, 18%
Croatia	4.76	56,538	Croats, 78% Serbs, 12%
Macedonia	2.04	25,713	Macedonians, 65% Albanians, 21% Turks, 5%
Montenegro	0.6	13,812	Montenegrins, 62% Muslims, 15% Serbs, 9%
Serbia	9.8	88,361	Serbs, 66% Albanians, 17% Hungarians, 4% Muslims, 2%
Slovenia	1.9	20,251	Slovenes, 88% Croats, 3% Serbs, 2%

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The Balkanization of Europe

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, most experts believe, has ominous implications for international order in the 1990s. A new wave of separatist movements—some peaceful, some violent—has swept across many continents. While the world's attention has been riveted on events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic and nationalist groups in countries as diverse as India, Canada, Sudan, and Great Britain are demanding independence. Existing states are breaking into smaller states, which in turn may splinter even further. Nowhere is this trend more evident than in eastern Europe. The geopolitical structure of the region that was held together by communism for forty-five years appears to be unraveling. Many in Europe hoped that economic and political cooperation would set the course for the future, but tribalism and separatism have seized the momentum. Unless leaders are able to contain it, experts believe nationalism will produce political instability and bloodshed in Europe for decades to come.

Major Religions

Islam, Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism

Roman Catholicism, Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy

Macedonian Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam

Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam

Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Islam

Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy

A Domino Effect?

Although the Bosnian war's devastating toll on human life motivated most calls for international intervention, the possibility that the war could spill over into neighboring nations is also a major concern among Western powers. There is widespread suspicion that Serbian aggression will not end in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "If the fighting spreads," Yugoslav political scientist Predrag Simic predicted, "Bosnia will look like kindergarten compared to the killing to come."

War between Croatia and Serbia might return. Croatian President Tudjman has vowed to recover territory lost to the Serbs during the six-month-long war in 1991. In early 1993, Croatian forces began fighting with Serb forces in occupied Croatian territories. Many experts are concerned that these minor skirmishes are just precursors to heavier and bloodier battles to come. However, the biggest fear of many European leaders is that the war in Bosnia will ensnare territories and countries outside of the three warring republics.

Kosovo, a formerly autonomous Yugoslav province and home to 200,000 Serbs, was forcibly placed under Serbian rule in 1991. Over 90 percent of Kosovo's population are ethnic Albanians, who have accused Serbian authorities of discrimination and harassment. They have demanded independence within Kosovo's borders and have promised equal rights for the Serbian minority. But it is unlikely that Serbia would ever permit independence for Kosovo. The harsh anti-Albanian rhetoric heard in the Serbian parliament has provoked fears that

Cracks in "Fortress Europe"

In December 1991, the leaders of twelve European nations signed the Maastricht treaty—a historic vision of a new, more integrated Europe. The agreement called for a single currency, a single visa, and unity on environmental, foreign, and social polices. The goal was to create a "United States of Europe" or "Fortress Europe" that would be the largest and one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world. After decades of division and fragmented markets, Europe stood on the verge of a new era of prosperity.

Suddenly, during the summer of 1992, the "unity train" hit a brick wall—the European people. In national referendums, voters in Denmark rejected the Maastricht treaty while France approved it only narrowly. To the dismay of Europe's leaders, who had worked for years negotiating the treaty, their constituents clearly did not share their enthusiasm for economic and political integration with their neighbors. As 1993 began, the "New Europe" looked a lot like the old Europe.

What went wrong? Many contend that the continuing recession across western Europe has soured many citizens on the idea of a single European market. Most observers agree that the twelve national leaders failed to adequately explain to their people the benefits an economically unified Europe would bring. However, others say the reasons for their reservations or outright rejection were fueled by nationalist fears and suspicions of other cultures. Many experts argue that although many anti-Maastricht politicians cloaked their arguments in economic terms, the underlying resistance to unity was provoked in part by suspicion of their European neighbors, particularly Germany. Germany is the most economically powerful state of the European Community. Compared to bloody civil wars, rejecting the unification treaty in a referendum was a polite and sophisticated display of nationalism. Many observers noted that it was nationalism nonetheless.

Denmark voted to approve the Maastricht treaty in a second referendum in May 1993, but the treaty still has to be ratified by Great Britain and faces challenges in Germany. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a staunch advocate of European union, recently warned: "If we don't create union now, the old evil spirits will return. They are not only in the Balkans."

The "evil spirits" Kohl refers to are xenophobia and racism. Violence against racial minorities and eastern European asylum seekers is growing at an alarming rate, particularly in Germany. Immigrants are being blamed for Germany's social and economic problems not just by neo-Nazi gangs, but by the majority of the population. Germany recently repealed its con-

another round of ethnic cleansing may be in store for Kosovo's Albanian population once the Serbs are finished in Bosnia. Many observers believe this aggression would provoke intervention from Albania (not a Yugoslav republic but a sovereign country), which sits just to the south of Serbia. To prevent this potential escalation of the Balkan conflict, 700 UN peacekeepers were sent to the Kosovo border with Albania in February 1993.

An outbreak of hostilities between Serbs and Kosovo's Albanians could also pull in Macedonia, the only former Yugoslav republic to win its independence without provoking a war. Situated between Serbia and Greece, Macedonia has a large Albanian population that is demanding independence and has clashed repeatedly with Macedonian police. The government fears that if fighting flares between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia will join the struggle.

If Macedonia gets caught up in a widening Balkan conflict, experts think Greece—a member of NATO—could become involved, probably on the side of Serbia, with whom it has had a long-standing economic relationship. "If we enter the war," says Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, "war would now be at the Greek frontier, at the frontier of a NATO country, and none of the neighboring countries, including Turkey, would remain disinterested." At this point, a conflict once dismissed as simply a "Yugoslav affair" would have destabilized almost half the European continent.

The Clinton administration has recognized the dangers of the war spilling over into Macedonia. In July 1993, 300 U.S. troops were dispatched to Macedonia to join 700 Scandinavian peacekeepers patrolling the border with Serbia.

A French woman walks past a wall of posters urging French voters to reject the Maastricht treaty.

stitutional guarantee of asylum to any politically oppressed person.

Antiforeigner sentiment has also taken hold in France and Great Britain, countries that also have struggling economies. Although the leaders of these nations have spoken out strongly against racism, many experts believe that unless their economies improve, xenophobia will surge, stalling European unity indefinitely.

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New World Disorder

In other parts of eastern Europe, nationalist conflicts are raging that are unrelated to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia has split into two separate states and in the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, ethnic conflicts have provoked fierce fighting. During the Soviet Union's seventy years of existence, the only common link between its ethnically and religiously diverse fifteen republics was the oppressive communist regime in Moscow. Once it collapsed, the rival ethnic populations in the republics began to assert their national identity and fight for their own turf and independence.

War in the Former Soviet Republics. Europe's second-bloodiest war is being fought between the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia over a disputed enclave of land called Nagorno-Karabakh. This mountainous region is located within the predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan but is inhabited mostly by Christian Armenians. The war between the two republics has lasted nearly five years and has claimed almost 2,000 lives and displaced more than 100,000 people, creating yet another flood of refugees in eastern Europe. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh threatens to embroil bigger regional powers, including Turkey and Iran, both of whom have strong ethnic and religious ties to Azerbaijan. Officials in Russia have warned Turkey to keep out of the conflict, fearing that escalation could, according to one Russian military official, lead to a "World War III."

Another ethnic war is tearing apart the former Soviet republic of Moldova. Fighting between Moldova's Romanian majority and its ethnic Russian minority has killed more than a thousand people. The Russian Slavs in Moldova populate territory they call the Dniester Republic. They want to break away from Moldova because the Romanian majority has talked of uniting with Romania, which borders on the republic. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has warned that he may send in Russian forces to protect the ethnic Russian minority if fighting continues.

"The Velvet Divorce." The peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia was in stark contrast to the bloodshed that has marred most secessionist and nationalist movements across eastern Europe.

The federation of Czechoslovakia was created in 1918 out of the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Czechs' heritage is tied to Austria and Germany while the Slovaks have a Hungarian background. The Slovaks—the poorer of the two groups—long believed that they were being exploited by the richer Czechs. Many think the split was inevitable after communist rule was overturned in 1989 by a peaceful democratic movement (called the "Velvet Revolution") led by playwright Vaclav Havel. When Havel was elected president in 1990, he tried to no avail to broker an agreement between the Czechs and Slovaks and keep the federation together. On January 1, 1993, after seventy-four years, Czechoslovakia was formally divided into two independent nations—the Czech Republic and Slovakia—in what some have dubbed "The Velvet Divorce."

International Order vs. Self-determination

The prospect of free-market capitalism and democratic governments has not been enough to keep rival ethnic, religious, and national groups together in eastern Europe during the early 1990s. The opportunity to control their own political destinies was too great for these groups to ignore. However, most foreign affairs experts believe that the breakup of nations, peaceful or violent, is a destabilizing force.

Although the secession of tribal groups may be a gain for liberty and self-determination, it is a loss for international peace and order. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared that "if every ethnic, religious, or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security, and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve." But can competing principles of self-determination and international order be reconciled? If more ethnic and nationalist groups demand independence, many experts predict the world will be a chaotic and violent place in the twenty-first century. On the other hand, if governments use strong-arm tactics to crack down on ethnic and religious minorities, authoritarianism will have triumphed over liberty.

The proliferation of tribalism throughout the world has persuaded many observers that stopping it outright will be difficult, if not impossible. The goal of the international community then should be to channel nationalist tensions into peaceful negotiations before violence erupts into, as one European diplomat said, "another Yugoslavia." To achieve this, international bodies need to formulate a concrete set of policies on how to respond to nationalist disputes.

Experts believe the key is for the United Nations to diffuse violence by persuading rival factions that peaceful resolution will better serve their individual interests. Many have called for the establishment of a UN "rapid deployment force." Such a force would be dispatched to regions threatened by nationalist conflict and prevent violence from breaking out, or stamp it out before it spreads. When nationalist conflict goes unchecked, as the wars in Croatia and Bosnia proved, it is difficult to contain.

Many diplomats and policymakers believe democratic governments can avoid secession if they grant a measure of autonomy to independence-minded ethnic groups. If these groups are convinced that they have some control over their own affairs and that their interests are being served on the federal level, the unity of a nation could be preserved.

There is virtual consensus that the international community's response to the war in the former Yugoslavia was inadequate. Western nations, while experienced in fighting communism worldwide, were clearly caught off guard by the eruption of a nationalist war in this eastern European country. As the major powers and the UN stand on the verge on military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many hope that they are keeping one eye on other potential nationalist hot spots around the world. Lessons learned in Bosnia can perhaps prevent "another Yugoslavia" from happening again.

For Further Reading

The following books and articles will provide information for further research on some of the topics covered in *War in Yugoslavia*.

Burg, Steven L. "Nationalism Redux: Through the Glass of the Post-Communist States Darkly." *Current History*, April 1993, pp. 162-68.

Doder, Dusko. "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds." *Foreign Policy*, No. 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-23.

Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

Hobsbawm, E.J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Magus, Branka. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New York: Verso, 1993

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. *Pandaemonium*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Ramet, Sabrina Petra. "War in the Balkans." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 79-98.

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

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War in Yugoslavia
Teacher's Guide

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The Close Up Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that encourages responsible participation in the democratic process through educational programs and publications in government and citizenship. Since its founding in 1971, Close Up has been committed to developing new and better ways for young people, teachers, and a widening circle of citizens of all ages to gain a practical understanding of how public policy affects their lives and how individual and collective efforts affect public policy. Close Up Publishing develops books, teacher's guides, and other materials designed to encourage critical thinking and inspire interest in current issues, government, foreign affairs, and economics.

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To the Teacher

War in Yugoslavia examines how the reemergence of nationalism in eastern Europe led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of a devastating war there. Many experts view the conflict in the former Yugoslav republics as a prototype of the nationalist wars that may characterize the post-Cold War era. *War in Yugoslavia* also analyzes the West's response to the conflict and surveys other parts of Europe where nationalism is on the rise.

The *War in Yugoslavia Teacher's Guide* offers classroom activities, handouts, and test materials around which you can create a comprehensive lesson plan. Used in conjunction with the text, this teacher's resource will help students gain a solid understanding of the events in Yugoslavia and the impact that nationalism will have in the coming years.

Objectives

This guide should help your students:

1. define nationalism and understand its impact on Europe in the first half of the twentieth century;
2. describe major events leading up to the war in Yugoslavia;
3. understand how and why the United States and its allies reacted to the conflict; and
4. speculate on nationalism's potential role in international affairs in the 1990s and what role the global community will take in combatting it.

Structure of the Lesson

The *War in Yugoslavia Teacher's Guide* contains the following components:

Key Terms

Key terms will help students understand the people, places, events, and concepts presented in *War in Yugoslavia*. The following activities will help reinforce student understanding of key terms:

1. Have a group of students develop a crossword puzzle using as many key terms from the book as possible. Distribute copies of the puzzle to the students and have them complete it as a review exercise before they take the unit test.

2. Divide students into groups. Assign each group five key terms, which they are to use in a rap, a poem, or a short story. Ask students to present their creations to the class, making sure that their fellow classmates will be able to understand the meaning of the key terms from listening to the presentations.

Motivator

The motivator is an activity designed to capture student interest, introduce the class to *War in Yugoslavia*, and encourage the active participation of all your students.

Student Activities

The guide contains three student activities that require students to exercise their critical thinking skills and do independent research. The activities also emphasize important information from the corresponding text, *War in Yugoslavia*.

Student Handouts

Student handouts may be reproduced for classroom use. Each is keyed to a student activity.

Test Materials

This section contains a variety of test questions that you can use to evaluate students' knowledge after completing the lesson or that students can use as a self-check tool. It includes true/false, multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, and essay questions taken from information presented in *War in Yugoslavia*.

Answer Key

The last section includes answers to all test questions in this teacher's guide.

Key Terms

arms embargo
"balkanization"
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Croatia
economic sanctions
"ethnic cleansing"
European Community (EC)
"Greater Serbia"
Hapsburg Empire
Radovan Karadzic
Kosovo
Maastricht treaty
Macedonia
Slobodan Milosevic
Muslims
nationalism
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Nuremburg Trials
Ottoman Empire
partition
safe havens
self-determination
separatism
Serbia
Marshall Tito
tribalism
Vance/Owen peace plan
"Velvet Divorce"
xenophobia

Motivator

Before beginning this lesson, conduct a brainstorming session. Write "nationalism" on the board and have students call out words and ideas that come to mind when they think of "nationalism." List them as they are mentioned. Are their responses generally positive or negative? What regions of the world come to students' minds when they think of nationalism? Write their answers on the board. Add any world regions to the list that students did not name. Point out that nationalism has been or could be a problem in many other places besides Yugoslavia and eastern Europe.

In addition, have students bring articles from newspapers or magazines about the war in the former Yugoslavia, other eastern European conflicts, or the European Community. Ask students to present a brief summary of their articles to the rest of the class. Pin the articles on a bulletin board. Finally, have students examine the map of the former Yugoslavia on page 9 and the profiles of the former republics on pages 24-25 in *War in Yugoslavia*.

Student Activities

1. Divide the class into "pro" and "con" groups of equal size and organize one or more debates over the following statement:

In the event of a peace agreement, the United States should commit U.S. forces to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping force

Students should use *War in Yugoslavia* and current magazine and newspaper articles to prepare their arguments for the debate. The affirmative or "pro" side should go first, followed by the negative or "con" side. After both groups have spoken for the same amount of time, allow a few minutes for each side to ask questions of the opposing group. Encourage students to use maps and photographs to enhance their presentations. Have the class vote on which side it believed "won."

Then distribute **Student Handout #1—Military Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia,** instructing students to answer the questions following each scenario. After they have completed the handouts, discuss with students their responses and write them on the board. Which situation did students most believe required military intervention? How many students think that U.S. armed forces should not be deployed to the Balkans under any circumstances?

2. Instruct students to develop a timeline from 1990 to the present listing the major events in eastern Europe regarding the war in the former Yugoslavia or any other violent nationalist conflicts. Students should use *War in Yugoslavia* and newspapers and magazines to find the necessary background and current information. The timelines should contain all major developments in the peace process between the warring factions and the role of the United States.

Then distribute **Student Handout #2—Nationalism in the Future.** Have students answer the questions on the handout. After they have finished, discuss the future of nationalism. Are they concerned about nationalism, or is it of no vital national interest for the United States?

3. Organize a community survey by dividing the class into six groups and assigning each group one of the following statements:

- The United States should send peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslavia to keep the sides apart and stop the killing and ethnic cleansing.
- The United States should militarily help the Bosnian Muslims defend their territory.
- The United States should not send troops to Yugoslavia, but should continue to provide food and medical relief to besieged and starving people whenever and wherever necessary.
- The United States should not commit troops to Yugoslavia until the EC takes the lead in trying to stop the war there.
- As the world's only superpower, the United States needs to lead the peace efforts in Yugoslavia.
- The United States should ignore the war in Yugoslavia unless it threatens our security or disrupts our national interest.

Each member of each group should ask five people in the community if they agree or disagree with the statement. After students have completed the survey, ask all groups to tally their results. Place the results for all six questions on the board. Which statements reflect the greatest agreement? With which actions do people generally disagree? Which statements show the widest diversity? What conclusions can the class draw regarding community attitudes about American actions in Yugoslavia? Do students think that their community reflects the attitude of most communities in the United States and the nation as a whole?

Student Handout #1

Military Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia

Read the following situations and answer the questions at the bottom of the page.

Situation 1. Fighting among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia continues throughout late 1993. Serbian President Milosevic reverses his peacemaker stance and resumes arms shipments to the Bosnian Serbs, telling them to fight on. The Bosnian Muslim population is on the verge of being wiped out. Facing little resistance from the West, the Serbs decide to capture the entire republic and make it part of Serbia.

Situation 2. Encouraged by its success in Bosnia and the West's reluctance to use military power to stop them, the Serbian parliament calls for the expulsion of all Albanians from the province of Kosovo, which Serbs believe rightfully belongs to them. Kosovo's Albanian population fear that they are the next target for Serb ethnic cleansing and call on neighboring Albania for military assistance. Ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia publicly vow to fight the Serbs if their brothers in Kosovo are attacked.

Situation 3. With 70 percent of Bosnia under their control, the Serbs agree to stop their offensive. They propose a three-way partition of the republic. Under their plan, the Serbs get to keep all the land they took by force, the Croats take 20 percent of Bosnia, and the Muslims are given roughly 10 percent. All sides agree, but the Muslims ask the United States and NATO to provide 50,000 peace-keeping troops to patrol the borders to keep the Serbs at bay.

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1. If you were the president of the United States, would you commit U.S. forces to Bosnia under any of the situations described above? Which ones and why? If not, explain why you believe the United States should not send troops to the region.

2. What do you believe will eventually happen in the former Yugoslavia? Will war in Bosnia drag on until the Serbs and Croats have taken over the entire republic? Or will the three sides eventually sign a peace agreement? Do you think the war will spread to other regions?

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Student Handout #2

Nationalism in the Future

Think about the following questions and answer accordingly.

1. Will the war in the former Yugoslavia prove to be more of an exception than a rule in the 1990s, or will the world witness more nationalist wars? Defend your answer.

2. Do you think nationalism in Europe and other parts of the world is a major threat to international stability? Why or why not?

3. Will the international community be better prepared to confront violent nationalist conflicts in the future after its experience in Yugoslavia? Why or why not?

4. Could the kind of nationalist tensions that have divided other nations ever divide the United States? Could separatism along racial lines ever occur in the United States? Why or why not?

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Test Materials

True/False: Use T for true and F for false, and place your answer in the blank. Use the space below the item to correct any statements you think are false.

____1. Serbs and Muslims are the two dominant ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.

____2. During his forty-year rule as Yugoslavia's president, Marshall Tito strengthened the power and authority of the Serbs in the federal government.

____3. Before the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina had the largest Serb population in Yugoslavia outside of Serbia.

____4. The Vance/Owen plan allows the Serbs to keep all of the territory they seized by force.

____5. The Clinton administration's "lift and strike" proposal was dropped in part because of European resistance to lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims in Bosnia.

Multiple Choice: Circle the letter preceding the best choice.

6. Which of the following terms best describes Germany's foreign policy during the 1930s?

a. isolationism
b. tribalism
c. expansionism
d. separatism

7. Most experts agree that the politician most responsible for inciting nationalism in Yugoslavia during the years leading up to the war was:

a. Radovan Karadzic
b. Franjo Tudjman
c. Alija Izetbegovic
d. Slobodan Milosevic

8. Which of the following countries was not a Yugoslav republic?

a. Macedonia
b. Albania
c. Slovenia
d. Croatia

9. In 1914, Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Princip was a:

a. Croatian
b. Serb
c. Russian
d. Turk

10. Which international organization made the first attempt to broker a peace agreement between Serbia and Croatia in 1991?

a. the European Community
b. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
c. the United Nations
d. the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Fill in the Blank: Complete each statement.

11. Hatred or fear of foreigners is called_____.

12. Slobodan Milosevic's goal in 1992 was to reunite Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia with Serbia and create "_____."

13. The leaders of Western Europe signed the _____ treaty in December 1991, a blueprint for European economic and political union.

14. Alija Izetbegovic protested the West's proposal to create_____ in Bosnia because he believed they would "ghettoize" Bosnian Muslims.

15. Many experts believe that Serbia's next target for ethnic cleansing will be the province of _____.

Essay: Write a complete answer for each of the following questions.

16. What is nationalism and how does it apply to the war in Yugoslavia?

17. What kind of action toward the war in Yugoslavia did the Clinton administration propose in April/May 1993 and why did it later back away from that proposal? What plan did the allies eventually agree on and why?

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Answer Key

Test Materials

1. F—The two dominant groups are Serbs and Croats.
2. F—Tito weakened the power of the Serbs.
3. T
4. F—The Vance/Owen plan would take back most of the seized territory.
5. T
6. c
7. d
8. b
9. b
10. a
11. xenophobia
12. Greater Serbia
13. Maastricht
14. safe havens
15. Kosovo

16. Nationalism is the devotion or loyalty to one nation, culture, or ethnic group. Nationalism differs from patriotism when it emphasizes the promotion or superiority of one group over another. Nationalism played a major role in the break up of Yugoslavia and the war that followed. Yugoslavia's diverse population had a long history of tension and suspicion that made it vulnerable to nationalist campaigns. Leaders in the Yugoslav republics promoted separatism by appealing to the tribal instincts of the country's many ethnic and religious groups. The Serbian government in particular stirred up hatred among Serbs toward their neighbors and waged a war of aggression against Croats and Muslims in an effort to create "Greater Serbia."

17. In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration proposed to the European allies that 1) the United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia's Muslims be lifted and 2) the U.S. and the allies conduct air strikes against Serb targets while the Muslims are rearming. The action was called "lift and strike." The proposal was shelved after the European allies rejected lifting the arms embargo and popular opinion in the United States was against any U.S. military intervention.

The United States and its allies agreed to implement "safe havens" around besieged Muslim enclaves in Bosnia that would be patrolled and protected by UN forces. This action was preferable to the West because it was a low risk military venture, would prevent further slaughter, and would help contain the conflict.